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ОДНОСОТ ПОМЕЃУ ПАТЕНТОТ, KNOW-HOW И 
ДОМИНАНТАТА ПОЛОЖБА ОД АСПЕКТ НА ЧЛЕН 102 ОД 
ДОГОВОРОТ ЗА ФУНКЦИОНИРАЊЕ НА 
ЕВРОПСКАТА УНИЈА (ДФЕУ)
Апстракт: Правата од индустриска сопственост, во кои спаѓаат 
и патенот и know-how се ексклузивни права кои му овозможуваат на 
нивниот сопственик да стекне одредена ексклузивна и доминантна 
положба на одреден пазар во однос на конкурентите. Често пати ваквата 
доминантна положба може да биде злоупоребена од сопственикот во 
однос на конкурентите кои не поседуваат вакви права, или пак поседуваат 
но недоволно успешно ги искористуваат. Со цел да се спречат можните 
злоупотреби на ваквата положба, Европската унија разви посебен систем 
на норми во рамки на правото на конкуренција. Истото од причина што, 
правото на конкуренција на ЕУ не претставува цел само по себе, туку 
правилата на конкуренција претставуваат средство за овозможување 
на правилно функционирање на единствениот пазар и за ефективно 
задоволување на потребите на потрошувачите. Овие правила во однос 
на приватно-правните субјекти опфаќаат три сегменти: а) забрана за 
рестриктивни договори и договорна пракса; б) забрана за злоупотреба 
на доминантната положба и в) контрола на концентрациите. Во рамки 
на овој труд ние ќе го разгледаме односот на патенотот и know-how во 
однос на вториот сегмент кој се однесува на забрана на злоупотреба 
на доминантната положба, за што одредби се содржани во член 102 од 
Договорот за функционирање на Европската унија (ДФЕУ). Со цел 
да дадеме попрегледна слика на сознанијата добиени од анализата 
на овој сооднос, истите се системски поделени во два дела. Првиот 
дел се однесува на анализа на соодносот помеѓу know-how, патентот и 
сфаќањето на доминантната положба во рамки на ЕУ, додека вториот дел 
се однесува на анализа на овие права и случаите кога постои злоупотреба 
на доминантната положба во рамки на претходно споменатиот правен 
систем. 
Клучни зборови: патент, „кnow-how“, доминантна положба, 
злоупотреба на доминантната положба, право на конкуренција, договор 
за функционирање на Европската унија (ДФЕУ)
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NASHKOVA Suzana 
THE RELATION BETWEEN PATENTS, KNOW-HOW AND THE 
DOMINANT POSITION FORM THE ASPECT OF ARTICLE 102 OF 
TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
(TFEU)
Abstract: Patents and know-how, as industrial property rights, are exclusive 
rights that allow to their owner to acquire an exclusive and dominant position 
on a relevant market over its competitors. In some situations this dominant 
position can be abused by the owner in relation to its competitors, who either 
do not possess such rights or they possess them but they are not able to exploit 
them as efficient as the former. In order to prevent the possible abuses of such 
position the European Union has developed a special system of norms within 
the domain of Competition Law. The establishment of this norms derives from 
the fact that the Competition law of EU is not an isolated objective, but its 
provisions constitute an adequate tool for successful functioning of the Single 
Market and for efficient satisfaction of the needs of the consumers. These 
rules regarding private legal entities covering three segments: a) prohibition 
on restrictive agreements and contractual practice b) prohibition of abuse of 
dominant position and c) control of the concentrations between undertakings. 
This article aims towards an analysis of the relation of the patents and know-
how in relation to the second segment, which concerns the dominant position, 
for which provisions are contained in Article 102 of TFUE. In order to give 
a more descriptive picture of this relation the information obtained from 
the analysis will be divided into the two parts. The first part examines the 
correlation between patents, know-how and the notion of dominant position in 
the EU, whilst the second part refers to the analysis of these rights and cases 
when there is abuse of a dominant position within the aforementioned legal 
system.
Key words: Patent, Know-how, Dominant position, Abuse of the dominant 
position, Competition Law; TFUE
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Introduction
According to the Article 102 (former article 86/82) on the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)1 the abuse of dominant position 
is prohibited, with no possibility of any exception. In fact, Article 102 of the 
Treaty states the following: “It is consistent with the common market and 
prohibits any abuse and exploitation of a dominant position within the common 
market or a significant part, by one or more undertakings if it could adversely 
affect trade between Member States (...).” More precisely, Article 102 of TFEU 
does not prohibit dominant position of the enterprise on the relevant market, 
but it only prohibits the abuse of such a position. In this context is the position 
of the Commission of the EU, adopted in one of its Communication,2 related 
to the Article 102 of TFUE where is stated that: “In accordance with the case-
law, it is not in itself illegal for an undertaking to be in a dominant position and 
such a dominant undertaking is entitled to compete on the merits. However, the 
undertaking concerned has a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to 
impair genuine undistorted competition on the common market.”3
The connection the patents, know-how and Article 102 of the Treaty is 
reflected in two domains: the relation of patents, know-how and the dominant 
position and relation between patents, know-how and the abuse of dominant 
position. In order to answer the question, how the possession of know-how, 
or the patent may lead to abuse of dominant position, which could harm the 
competition, we will make an analysis of these two groups of questions, 
by giving a further overview of the part the decisions of the European 
Commission4and the European Court of Justice5 related to the regulation of 
this matter.
1. Patents, know-how and the dominant position
Within the first group of questions pertaining to the dominant position will 
take into consideration: 1) the relation of know-how and patents with the notion 
dominant position; 2) the ways of determination of the dominant position and 
1)  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU, 2007), Consolidate version - OJ C 
326, 26.10.2012, [hereinafter The Treaty]. 
2)  Communication from the European Commission—Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant un-
dertakings, (2009/C 45/02). 
3) Ibid, paragraph 1. 
4) European Commission of EU [hereinafter also refers as EC or The Commission] 
5) European Court of Justice [hereinafter also refers as ECJ or The Court] 
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3) its appearing forms.6
1.1 The relation of know-how and patents with the notion dominant 
position - Article 102 of the Treaty does not expressly define the notion 
dominant position, but from the practice of the European Commission and the 
European Court of Justice, it can be concluded that the dominant position, is 
characterized by the economic supremacy of the enterprise, on a relevant market. 
For example, the Commission in one of its decisions in the Europemballage 
Case, otherwise referred to as the Continental Can Case,7defines the dominant 
position as follows: 
“Enterprises are in dominant position when they have the possibility 
of independent behaviour, which places them in a condition to act without 
taking noticeable account of competitors, byers or suppliers. Such is the 
case when by reason of their part of the market, or such part in conjunction 
with their disposal of technical knowledge, raw materials or capital, they 
have the possibility of determining prices or of controlling the production 
or distribution for significant part of the relevant products; and this 
possessing such to eliminate any will on the part of their economic 
partners; it is sufficient that it is strong enough on the whole to ensure to 
such enterprises a global independence of behaviour, even though there 
exist differences of intensity of their influence on the different partial 
markets.”8 
Similar definitions are contained in the judgements of the European Court 
of Justice - United Brands9 and Hoffmann La Roche10 where the dominance 
has been defined under Community law as: “position of economic strength 
enjoyed by an undertaking, which enables it to prevent effective competition 
being maintained on a relevant market, by affording it the power to behave 
to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its customers 
6) Damjanovič, K. (2001). Ugovor o know-how-u i pravila konkurencii u pravo Evropske Unije i 
u domaćem pravu. Pravo i privreda, vol.38, N.5/8, p. 727. 
7) Judgment of the Court of 21 February 1973. Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can 
Company Inc. v Commission of the European Communities.  Case 6-72, European Court Reports 
1973 -00215. 
8) Ladas, P.S. (1975). Patents, trademarks, and related rights: national and international protection: 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press., pp.740-741.  
9) Judgment of the Court of 14 February 1978. United Brands Company and United Brands Con-
tinentaal BV v Commission of the European Communities. Chiquita Bananas. Case 27/76. Euro-
pean Court Reports 1978 -00207. Paragraph 65. 
10) Judgment of the Court of 13 February 1979. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commis-
sion of the European Communities. Case 85/76. Paragraph 38. European Court Reports 1979 
-00461. 
НАШКОВА Сузана   
 177
and ultimately of consumers”.11More precisely, the dominant position is 
not characterized by the absence of any competition, but just a competition 
that is insufficient to prevent a company that has such a position to act 
autonomously and thus affect the behaviour of other entities. In this context is 
the aforementioned judgement of ECJ- Hoffmann La Roche, where is defined 
that: “(…) the behaviour of an undertaking in a dominant position which is 
such as to influence the structure of a market where, as a result of the very 
presence of the undertaking in question , the degree of competition is weakened 
(…)”. Dominance entails that these competitive constraints are not sufficiently 
effective and hence that the undertaking in question enjoys substantial market 
power over a period of time. This means that the undertakings decisions are 
largely insensitive to the actions and reactions of competitors, customers and, 
ultimately, consumers. The Commission may consider that effective competitive 
constraints are absent even if some actual or potential competition remains.12 
In this context, the question arises, to what extent the possession of 
know-how or patent may give the enterprise economic domination over other 
enterprises on the relevant market? The jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Justice shows that the possession of patent, know-how or other industrial 
property right does not automatically allows the company to acquire a dominant 
position in the market. This position of the Court has been adopted in the 
judgement Parke Davis13 where was stated : the existence of the rights granted 
by a member state to the holder of a patent is not affected by the prohibitions 
contained in articles 85(1 ) and 86 of the treaty . The exercise of such rights 
cannot of itself fall either under article 85(1) (…) or under article 86, in the 
absence of any abuse of a dominant position.” Thus we can concluded that, the 
exclusivity that characterizes the industrial property rights does not presuppose 
ipso facto existence of a dominant position. Only in a situations when on the 
relevant market does not exist any substitute for the product protected by 
patent or produced on the basis of know-how, there will be coincidence of the 
11) Communication from the Commission—Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities 
in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, 
(2009/C 45/02), p. C 45/8, paragraph 10.  
12) Communication from the Commission—Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities 
in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, 
(2009/C 45/02), p. C 45/8. Paragraph 10. See also: Damjanovič, K. (2001). Ugovor o know-how-u 
i pravila konkurencii u pravo Evropske Unije i u domaćem pravu. Pravo i privreda, vol.38, N.5/8, 
pp. 727-728. 
13) Judgment of the Court of 29 February 1968. - Parke, Davis and Co. v Probel, Reese, Beintema-
Interpharm and Centrafarm. - Reference for a preliminary ruling: Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage - 
Netherlands. - Case 24-67. 
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dominant position of the enterprise and the possession of this right.14
1.2 Determination of the dominant position - In general, a dominant 
position derives from a combination of several factors which, taken separately, 
are not necessarily determinative.15 In relation to the assessment and the 
determination of the dominant position in EU law are mainly used three groups 
of criteria. Those are the: criteria related to the structure of the enterprise (e.g., 
dimensions, size of the market covering);16 criteria related to the conduct of the 
enterprise (for example, imposing prices) and criteria related to the results or 
consequences of the behaviour of the enterprise (e.g., technical and industrial 
capacity of the enterprise, which presumably has a dominant position, which 
on the other hand may deter other companies from the intention to enter the 
market).  Regarding the patents and know-how, is especially significant the 
decision ZOJA17 where the Court and the Commission found that enterprises 
have a dominant position on an intermediary-product necessary for the 
production of drugs against tuberculosis. The Court and the Commission 
determined that the enterprises enjoyed such position because the alternative 
procedures for obtaining competing drugs were experimental level.18 The 
decisive element in reaching this decision was the fact that these enterprises 
with their behaviour in an indirect manner have inflicted the technological 
progress of other companies.19
14)  Ibid. supra note 10, p. 728.
15) Case 27/76 United Brands and United Brands Continentaal v Commission [1978] European 
Court Reports 207, paragraphs 65 and 66; Case C-250/92 Gøttrup-Klim e.a. Grovvareforeninger v 
Dansk Landbrugs Grovvareselskab [1994] ECR I-5641, paragraph 47; Case T-30/89 Hilti v Com-
mission [1991] ECR II-1439, paragraph 90., see in: Communication from the Commission—Guid-
ance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive 
exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, (2009/C 45/02), p. C 45/8. Paragraph 10.
16) For example, if we analyse the market share of the beverage Coca Cola, on the market of 
sparkling beverages or drinks based on sugar, then we can conclude that the company does not 
have a dominant position on the relevant market. Additionally, but we analyse its share the rel-
evant market of drinks based on Cola, it is undeniable that there is a dominant position. see in: 
Damjanovič, K., Marič, V. (2007) Intelektualna svojina, Beograd: Službeni Glaznik, р.371.
17)  Judgment of the Court of 14 March 1973. Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano S.p.A. and Commer-
cial Solvents Corporation v Commission of the European Communities. Joined cases 6 and 7/73 R. 
European Court Reports 1973 -00357.
18)  Ibid, supra note 11.
19) As pointed out above, within the third set of criteria, prevention of technological develop-
ment is the criterion which is taken into account in the determination of dominant position of 
enterprises.
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1.3 Forms of the dominant position. 
When it comes to the forms of dominant position we can distinct two 
different models. First one refers to the possibility of the enterprise to control 
of the market for certain products, which can be realized either through 
technological superiority, either by running a special technological politics. 
Another form of dominant position is reflected trough the control of the 
enterprise which has a dominant position over the other economic entities, 
which allows to this enterprise (based on the economic power it has) to control 
the entrance of other undertakings on the relevant market or to completely 
prevent their entry.20 
2. Patents, know-how and the abuse of the dominant position
In order to be able to determine the relationship between the agreements 
for license of patents and know-how and the abuse of dominant position, we 
will must first look at the 1) notion of abuse of dominant position and 2) its 
forms.
1.1 The notion abuse of a dominant position. 
This term is not directly nor indirectly defined in Article 102 of the Treaty. 
The relevant institution of the European Union (Commission and Court of 
Justice) are determining its character by examining the two elements. First the 
subject of the abuse and second its legal nature.
 First, If we go back to the position of the European Court of Justice, 
according to which the exclusivity that characterizes the industrial property 
rights does not presumed ipso facto existence of a dominant position, than it 
is quite clear that only the use or refusal to use of the right, may initiate abuse 
of dominant position, (which would be contrary to Article 102 of the Treaty).21
Second, the question concerning the nature of the abuse of the dominant 
position comes down to the question, whether the abuse of a dominant position 
is from objective or subjective character? Regarding this issue the Commission 
expressed its position in one of its memorandums.22 In this Memorandum, the 
Commission stressed that the abuse of a dominant position should result from 
20)  Damjanovič, K. (2001). Ugovor o know-how-u i pravila konkurencii u pravo Evropske Unije i 
u domaćem pravu. Pravo i privreda, vol.38, N.5/8, p. 326.
21) Nevertheless, as is clear from that case-law, exercise of an exclusive right by the owner may, in 
exceptional circumstances, involve abusive conduct (Volvo, paragraph 9, and Magill, paragraph 
50).  
22) It is the Commission’s Memorandum on the Problems of concentration of the Common Market, 
1.12.1965, SEC (65)3500, which constitutes the first investigation on how mergers may be con-
trolled on European level. 
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the conduct of the enterprise, which conduct objectively is contrary to the 
objectives of the Treaty. Accordingly, we can conclude that the Commission 
has accepted the objective criteria for determination of the abuse of dominant 
position. This position is also accepted by the European Court of Justice, which 
the assertion that the abuse of a dominant position is from objective character, 
has explained in the aforementioned judgment Hoffman - La Roche. Thus in 
paragraph 6 is stated: “The concept of abuse is an objective concept relating 
to the behaviour of an undertaking in a dominant position which is such as to 
influence the structure of a market where, as a result of the very presence of 
the undertaking in question, (…)” The decisions of these two institutions show 
that they are not interested in determining the causes which conditioned the 
abuse of a dominant position (subjective criterion), but the main focus is the 
real situation, or the actual abuse of the  dominant position (objective criterion). 
However, the Commission and the Court nevertheless took into account the 
situations that were the enterprise caused this situation intentionally. Hence, 
the existence of intention in these situations is interpreted as an aggravating 
circumstance.23 
1.2 Forms of abuse of the dominant position. 
Opposite of the notion of the abuse of the dominant position, which 
is not defined in Article 102 of the TFEU, the forms of its appearance are 
explicitly set forth in this article. More precisely the Article 102 foresees 
the following four forms24 whose existence can lead to abuse of dominant 
position. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: (a) directly or indirectly 
23) This position could be seen in other cases that are not directly connected with the patents and 
know-how, but we will mention them as an illustration of this position of the aforementioned 
bodies.  In Irish Sugar and Compagnie Maritime Belge, the subjective intent of the dominant 
undertaking to respond to new entry was, absent evidence of predation within the meaning of 
AKZO, the decisive element that led to the prohibition decision. Order of the Court (Fifth Cham-
ber) of 10 July 2001.  Irish Sugar plc v Commission of the European Communities. Appeal - Article 
86 of the EC Treaty (now Article 82 EC) Case C-497/99 P. European Court Reports 2001 I-05333, 
and the Decision 85/609/EEC: Commission Decision of 14 December 1985 relating to a proceed-
ing under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty (IV/30.698 - ECS/AKZO) OJ L 374, 31.12.1985, p. 1–27. 
See more in: Art, J.Y., & Colomo, P.I. (2010). Chapter 6: Judicial Review in Article 102: in Etro, F. 
& Kokkoris, I, Competition Law and the Enforcement of Art. 102. Oxford University Press, p.4. 
24)  The list contained in Article 102 of the Treaty, can be complemented with several forms of 
behavior of the undertaking which has a dominant position, and that can be considered as abuse 
of the same. Such are, for example, awards made by the enterprises that have or pretend had a 
dominant position on the relevant market, the other undertakings, which in order to receive 
this award, have not concluded an agreement with the enterprise which is a competitor of the 
enerprise, who given the award. Furthermore, as a possible form of abuse is the imposition of 
very low prices for manufactured products (predatory pricing) in order to eliminate competition; 
unjustified refusal of delivery of necessary products to the competing enterprises and so on. See 
more : Damjanovič, K., Marič, V. (2007). Intelektualna svojina, Beograd: Službeni Glaznik, p. 372.
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imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of 
consumers; (c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with 
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; (d) 
making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial 
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts. Each of this 
forms will be further analysed from the aspect of its interference with the 
patents and know-how agreements. 
First, in terms of the of the imposition of unfair purchase or selling prices, 
for the agreements for patent and know-how occurs extremely sensitive 
issue, because it interfere with compensation that was determined for these 
agreements, and which by the opinion of the Court is an integral part of the 
subject matter of these agreements.25 Regarding the imposition of prices for 
protected products, the competition authorities of EU took the position that 
the imposed price should be justified to some extent. If the undertaking which 
has a dominant position on the relevant market impose “excessive prices” for 
protected products or the products based on know-how, then the agreement 
would fallen under the provisions of Article 102 of the Treaty, i.e. would be 
considered null and void. General level in terms of which could be determined 
whether the price is “excusive”, is very difficult and remains a fundamental 
problem.  As the ECJ stated, a price is excessive if it bears no more “reasonable 
relation to the economic value of the product.”26 However, this “relation” 
could not be established for all types of patent and know-how agreements. 
Therefore, the European Commission and European Court of Justice27 took 
the view that this level will be determined separately for each case, taking 
in that into account all relevant circumstances. Regarding the imposition of 
unfair trading conditions and prices, the bodies of the Union took the position 
that the agreements for know-how, or patent will be excluded from the effect 
of Article 102, despite the fact that they contain unfair trading conditions, if 
25) Judgment of the Court of 31 October 1974. Centrafarm BV and Adriaan de Peijper v Sterling 
Drug Inc. Case 15-74. European Court Reports 1974 -01147.
26) ECJ, Judgment of 13 November 1975, Case 26/75, General Motors Continental v. Commission 
[1975] ECR 1367 at Rec. 12, United Brands, and Judgment of 11 November 1986, Case 226/84, 
British Leyland v. Commission [1986] ECR 3263 at Rec. 27, see: Damme, E. v., Larouche, P., & 
Müller, W. (2006). Abuse of a Dominant position: Cases and Experiments. Tilburg University, 
p.1-52.
27)  In  any event,  European  competition  authorities  have  repeatedly  stated  that  they  did  not 
want  to become price regulators, and accordingly only few cases  of excessive pricing have been 
pursued. The leading case remains the ECJ judgment in United Brands. Ibidem. 
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the imposition of such conditions is necessary to accomplish the objective of 
the agreement. If the imposition of these conditions is unjustified, i.e. their 
imposition is not in relation to achievement of the goal of these agreements, it 
will be considered that the undertaking which has a dominant position in the 
relevant market has abused its position, thus such an agreement, in accordance 
with Article 102, would be considered null or void.
The second form of abuse of dominant position, refers to the limitation of 
the production, distribution and technical development. It shall be considered 
that undertaking which has a dominant position has abused it, if it had limited 
the production to other enterprises by conditioning the production with a 
control on the supply of protected products - basic products (raw materials) or 
intermediates, which are all necessary for other companies to produce the final 
products.28 Thus, the Court of Justice in one of its judgements,29 stated that the 
fact that company CSC, decided to fully stop the sale of the production of raw 
materials, in order to provide control over the production of derivatives by 
competing firms (whose production was dependent on the production of its raw 
materials), aiming towards the full elimination of the competitive enterprises 
in terms of derivatives, presents an act of abuse of dominant position. Case 
law on refusals to license intellectual property rights has traditionally set very 
high standards for intervention. In particular, the IMS Health case required 
that such a refusal prevents the emergence of a “new product”. An analysis 
of the Microsoft case leads to similar conclusions. In Microsoft case, the 
Commission found the undertaking’s refusal to license to be abusive, but not 
on the basis of this “new product requirement”. Instead, the theory of harm 
was based on the assumption that the behaviour hindered follow-on innovation 
in the relevant market. According  to  the  Commission,  licensing  of  the 
dominant  undertaking’s  intellectual  property leading to a more fragmented 
market structure would yield more innovation. The logic of the relationship 
is not obvious and it has been questioned by reputed academics.30 However, 
the ECJ did not examine the logic underpinning the choice made by the 
28)  Damjanovič, K. (2001). Ugovor o know-how-u i pravila konkurencii u pravo Evropske Unije i 
u domaćem pravu. Pravo i privreda, vol.38, N.5/8, p.728-730.
29)  Order of the President of the Court of 14 March 1973. Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano S.p.A. 
and Commercial Solvents Corporation v Commission of the European Communities. Joined cases 
6 and 7/73R. European Court Reports 1973 -00357.
30) Lévêque, F. (2005). Innovation, leveraging and essential facilities: interoperability licensing in the 
EU Microsoft case:  World Competition, vol.  28, n. 1, pp.  71-91. Katz, M. l., and Shelanski, H. 
(2006). See in:  Mergers and Innovation: Antitrust Law Journal, vol. 74, pp. 1-86. See in: Art, J.Y., & 
Colomo, P.I. (2010). Chapter 6: Judicial Review in Article 102: in Etro, F. & Kokkoris, I, Competi-
tion Law and the Enforcement of Art. 102. Oxford University Press, p.8. 
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Commission, nor whether this logic was a sound or tenable one. It only noted 
that the interpretation of the notion of abuse as put forward in the decision was 
supported by a literal reading of Article 102(b), which refers to the limitation 
of technical development.31
The third form of abuse of the dominant position refers to the situation 
when the enterprise is applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions 
with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage. 
License agreements are subject to frequent assessments under Article 102 
regarding the fact whether they contain discriminatory conditions, primarily in 
terms of compensation. This is primarily due to the fact that in these agreements 
compensation is determined on the basis of free assessment of the parties for 
each specific agreement, so it often may seems discriminatory in relation to the 
competitors on the market. However, based on the EU case law in this domain 
it could be concluded that when it comes to the license agreements, differences 
concerning the amount of compensation or other terms of the agreement will 
not fall under the application of Article 102(c), unless entail serious distortions 
of competition or if cannot be found real justification for such behaviour of the 
enterprise.  Concerning the term “dissimilar conditions” we will mention the 
decision GEMA.32 Namely, in this decision the Commission condemned  the 
German company  GEMA  for the fact  that  it requested  importers of  magnetic 
tape  recorders  and  magneto-scopes  a  bigger  royalty  than  the  one owed 
by  the  German  manufacturers,   without  admitting  the  grounds  according 
to  which  the control cost  was  much  more  important  in  the  first  case 
than  the  second. From this decision it can be concluded that discrimination in 
terms of determining the license fee on the basis of nationality of the licensee 
is inadmissible, therefore this agreement shall be considered null or void. 
Also, for abuse of a dominant position had been convicted and the corporation 
IBM.33 This decision was taken when IBM refused to supply other enterprises 
with the necessary software that they needed for installation on other computer 
systems, and not just on those manufactured by IBM.34
31) Microsoft, paras. 647-648. See in: Art, J.Y., & Colomo, P.I. (2010). Chapter 6: Judicial Review 
in Article 102: in Etro, F. & Kokkoris, I, Competition Law and the Enforcement of Art. 102. Oxford 
University Press, p.4.
32)  Order of the Court 18 August 1971. GEMA (Gesellschaft für musikalische Aufführungs- und 
mechanische Vervielfältigungsrechte) v Commission of the European Communities. Case 45-71 R.
33) Judgment of the Court of 11 November 1981. International Business Machines Corporation v 
Commission of the European Communities. Competition - Annulment of the decision to initiate a 
procedure and of the statement of objections. Case 60/81. European Court Reports 1981 -02639
34)  Damjanovič, K. (2001). Ugovor o know-how-u i pravila konkurencii u pravo Evropske Unije i 
u domaćem pravu. Pravo i privreda, vol.38, N.5/8, p.731.
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Lastly, the fourth form of abuse of the dominant position refers to the 
cases when the conclusion of the agreement is a subject to acceptance of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial 
usage, have no connection with the subject of such agreements. For example, if 
the conclusion of an agreement for patent or know-how, has been conditioned 
with the purchase of products that have no connection with the subject of the 
contract, it shall be considered that the enterprise which has imposed such 
conditions has abused its position. Related to the patents and “know how” is 
the decision of the Commission, Parke Davis, where the Commission have 
condemned one of the parties for imposing an exclusive purchasing obligation 
concerning products not covered by the patent.35 However, an exception to this 
rule, makes the case where the purchase of these products is it necessary for the 
proper use of technical subject matter of the agreement.36
Conclusion
The provisions related to the determination of the dominant position 
and the forms of its abuse has given rise to some of the most controversial 
debates within the EU Competition Law.  The reason why patents, know-
how and the agreements that are legal basis for use of these rights are subject 
of the Competition Law, finds its basis in the imperfection of the market of 
intellectual property rights. Namely, the simple fact that the compensation for 
this agreements is determined on the basis of free assessment of the parties, 
can easily transform this agreement into an instrument of unfair competition. 
Article 102 of TFEU contains detailed provisions that largely determined the 
dominant position and forms that constitute its abuse, however to date the 
application of these norms regarding patent and know-how agreements is 
causing considerable controversy. Moreover, same controversy around the 
choices made in individual cases seems natural and inevitable as a result. 
Hence, the EC and ECJ are facing a most challenging task. They need to 
draw a meaningful line between the free competition between enterprises/
undertakings on the Single Market and the limits to which extends this freedom 
(as defined in Article 102), which in the same time will not affect adversely 
their technological development. The case law formed upon the decisions of 
the aforementioned bodies constitute a sufficient basis for the orientation of 
enterprises in terms of the assessment of their position and the foundations 
35) Commission Decision of 10 January 1979 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC 
Treaty (IV/C-29.290 Vaessen/Moris). Official Journal L 019, 26/01/1979 P. 0032 – 0036.
36) Ibid, supra note 35.
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of their behaviour in the case if they cannot be determined on a basis of the 
provisions contained in Article 102. However in a vast bulk of cases when 
it comes to the patents and know-how neither case law, nor the provisions 
of Article 102, ate not sufficient basis for determination and existence of 
the abuse of dominant position. Therefore, the European Commission, will 
need to take additional efforts in order to respond in detail to a significant 
number inherently complex questions such as: What is unfair purchase or 
excusive prices? What are unfair trading conditions for patent and know-
how agreements? How know-how and patents can limit the production to the 
prejudice of the consumer? and so on. 
We sure hope that the near future holds a promise for such regulation 
to be adopted within the EU legislation, which will contribute towards the 
facilitation of the transfer of these rights between the enterprises and in the 
same time will not lead to the abuse of the dominant position, and thus harm 
the competition. 
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